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DAVID D E M E R IT T
CUBAN ANNEXATION, SLAVE POW ER PARANOIA, 
AND T H E  COLLAPSE OF TH E DEMOCRATIC PARTY
IN MAINE, 1850-1854
“T he extensive business connections which exist between 
the citizens of our whole State and Cuba make the invasion of 
that island a m atter of great im portance.” So spoke the 
Portland Advertiser on May 29, 1850 as it reported the latest 
news of the Cardenas Expedition, a privately organized assault 
on the Spanish colony launched from New Orleans with Amer­
ican money, men, and m unitions. Despite a num ber of strong 
commercial interests in Cuba, Mainers, except for a few news­
paper comments like the above, expressed little concern about 
the first two such annexationist efforts in 1850 and 1851. Sev­
eral years later, however, rabid sectional paranoia colored their 
reaction to a sim ilar effort in 1854. In that year, the Pine Tree 
State’s impassioned outcry against Cuban annexation not only 
helped to defer American im perial designs on the island, but 
also served as a lightning rod for rhetoric which emerging party 
leaders used to cement a new political synthesis that pushed the 
nation closer to Civil War.
This transform ation of sentiment poses several im portant 
historical questions. Why did Maine, a northern state, favor 
Cuban annexation at all? What happened in three short years 
that changed people’s minds so completely? How could their 
reactions have affected the destinies of both the United States 
and Cuba so dramatically? The answers to these questions 
m ight reveal something about antebellum political life.
Early rumors of the Cardenas Expedition filtered back to 
Maine in late May of 1850. T he first dispatches conflicted 
widely, but by the middle of June the true com position of this 
filibustering mission, as such invasions were termed, and its 
eventual result had become apparent to the Pine Tree State’s 
anxious observers.1 In callous disregard both of U.S. and inter­
national law, Narciso Lopez, a Cuban revolutionary, aided by 
the H avana Club, a New York based um brella organization for
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exiled Creoles and southern annexationists, recruited an army 
of some six hundred mercenaries and sailed from New Orleans 
for Cardenas. There, the arrival of Spanish reinforcements 
forced the filibusterers to beat a hasty retreat back to Key West, 
where the Spanish could only protest their escape.2
Undaunted by this first failure to incite Cubans to rebel­
lion, Lopez set about organizing another invasion. Influential 
southerners, like Mississippi Governor John  Q uitm an, not 
only offered financial assistance but also helped the filibuster­
ers evade neutrality laws.3 T he section's vehement expansion­
ists, who were popularly known as “Young America,” saw 
Cuba and Central America as an opportunity  to extend their 
peculiar institution, which, by the 1850s, appeared to have 
reached its natural limit. If annexed, the Spanish colony, with 
its flourishing slave plantations, would have provided the 
South with more power in Congress. Moreover, its fully 
stocked slave markets offered a solution to chronic labor 
shortages, which were the greatest obstacle to increasing cotton 
production.4 De Bow ’s Review, published in New Orleans, the
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center of the filibuster movement, outlined these argum ents in 
a series of influential articles on Cuban annexation. T his line 
of reasoning rendered “ the acquisition of Cuba ... the only 
measure of policy in regard to which the people of the South 
feel any special and present interest.”5
Although the filibusterers were greeted with warm feelings 
in the southern United States, their reception in Cuba rendered 
this support immaterial; the second invasion failed even more 
disastrously than the first. Lopez and alm ost all of the men in 
the Bahia Honda Expedition were captured and executed by 
Spanish authorities. Their failure was inevitable. As William 
Crittenden, nephew of U. S. Attorney General John  J. C rit­
tenden, noted bitterly in the letter he was allowed to compose 
before his execution and subsequent dismemberment at the 
hands of a Havana mob, “We have been grossly deceived ... 
D uring my short sojourn in this island I have not met a single 
p a tr io t... I am sure th a t ... Lopez has no friends.”6 Annexation 
to the United States had few advocates in Cuba.
I  n the Maine press, however, annexation was popular and 
received considerable support, although opin ion  on the fili­
buster missions was generally divided along party lines: Demo­
crats were sympathetic and Whigs critical. T he Republican  
Journal of Belfast was typical, presum ing “ that not one Ameri­
can out of one hundred would be sorry to see the adventurers 
succeed.” 7 T he Democracy’s standard carrier and its oldest 
paper in Maine, the Eastern Argus of Portland, followed with 
an article listing “a portion of the grievances of which the 
Cubans com plain ,” and adding, “We do not think they greatly 
over-state them .” Such statements were as vehement as any in 
the South. Later, both papers were also loud supporters of the 
ill-fated Bahia Honda mission.8
M aine’s Whigs, on the other hand, were more reserved. 
They “d istrusted] the motives of these new invaders, and can­
not rejoice at their prospective success.” The Bangor Whig and 
Courier elaborated a “conviction that the present m ovem ent...
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is not ... so much in behalf of hum an freedom as of hum an 
slavery.” Nativist sentiments lay at the heart of Portland Adver­
tiser objections to Cuban invasion: “We do not want a m illion 
of slaves added to those we already have.” The Whig organ 
closest to proceedings in the state capitol, the Kennebec Jour­
nal, summarized both these arguments. Distrust of the “p ri­
vate, sinister and sectional motives” of the filibusterers and an 
“aversion to any more slaves” added grist to com plaints about 
expeditions “in violation of law and of repeated promises ... to 
the Spanish government by ours.”9
Such partisan fidelity, however, was often difficult to 
m aintain when, as in the case of filibustering, the institution of 
slavery was at issue. In Bangor, the Jeffersonian broke from 
Democratic regulars in its belief that the invaders’ “flag of Free 
Cuba ... would be more appropriately styled the T lag  of C ut­
throat Bandits,’ if it is intended to be the symbol of the expedi­
tion to invade Cuba.” Its editors, Joseph Bartlett and Benjamin 
Burr, earned the scorn of their neighbor, the Democrat, which 
loudly endorsed the “ liberators of Cuba” and fiercely defended 
the rights of the filibusterers.10 Under pressure, Bartlett and 
Burr soon stepped back from com plete opp o sitio n  and 
acknowledged “ the oppressive yoke of tyrants in Cuba,” but 
m aintained that “ there is a right way and a wrong way to aid 
the downtrodden.” 11 Whigs, in Bangor at least, were no more 
unanim ous. In this city, the Mercury and the Whig and Cour­
ier, two sheets pledging loyalty to Clay’s party, quarreled over 
filibustering. The Mercury endorsed Cuban annexation, while 
its rival was critical.12 Such intraparty conflicts grew increas­
ingly  com m on under the strain  of con tinued  slavery 
agitation .13
Nonetheless filibustering remained only a relatively 
m inor issue. In fact, distance from the coast of M aine and its 
robust trade with Cuba reduced interest in this matter consider­
ably. In Portland, the center of this commerce, news and editor­
ials about filibustering were prom inently featured in both the 
Portland Advertiser and the Eastern Argus . The latest inform a­
tion consistently appeared, with bold headlines, in the first
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colum n of these two sheets. Nestled am ong them was the 
Havana market news which gave these bulletins their over­
riding importance. Farther inland, the Oxford Democrat also 
reported dispatches from Lopez’s expeditions, but they 
appeared on the back pages and received little emphasis. In 
fact, its South Paris editors took no position on either inva­
sion.14 Indifference to Cuban affairs was also the reaction in 
Farm ington. Bulletins in the Chronicle were placed at the 
bottom of the last columns with neither headlines nor boldface. 
No editorials appeared, but hints of antipathy towards the 
Bahia H onda mission and its idea of “extending slavery” 
emerged in a feature on presidential hopefuls.15 In Dover- 
Foxcroft, the Piscataquis Observer waited until late June 1850 
to jo in  regular Democrats in advocating “a radical reform in 
the mode of governing Cuba.” It was a little quicker to hop on 
the bandwagon for the second invasion, but the event received 
little attention. Generally, the death of former New H am pshire 
governor Levi Woodbury seemed far more im portant to these 
inland editors.16
Controversy over filibustering was further minimized 
because most editors accepted the prevailing expansionist doc­
trine of the era: Manifest Destiny. The Saco Democrat invoked 
this very phrase: “Most people believe that it is Uncle Sam’s 
manifest destiny to possess all the land that joins him. The only 
question is, as to the time and manner of occupying the land.”17 
Americans felt deeply that conquest had been preordained, and 
the recent past certainly seemed to bear this out. T he huge 
Louisiana Purchase was supplemented by the purchase of Flor­
ida. Later, Texas was annexed, and California conquered. 
Cuba would come next.18
Sitting only ninety miles offshore, the island was seen by 
Americans as a natural addition to the republic. A lecturer in 
Bangor described to his attentive audience “ the day when Cuba 
will be annexed to the United States and its resources developed 
fully, its population increased and ... [the island] made the 
garden of the w orld.” 19 Mainers like J. C. Hum phreys, a 
Brunswick box shook m anufacturer with interests in the
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island, were confident that "Cuba is undoubtedly ours ... if we 
w ant it .” 20 Another New Englander, John  Quincy Adams, 
appealed to science to explain the inevitability of the island’s 
annexation.
T here are laws of political as well as physical 
gravitation, and if an apple, severed by the tempest 
from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the 
ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own u n ­
natural connection with Spain, and incapable of self- 
support can gravitate only towards the North Ameri­
can Union, which by the same law of nature, cannot 
cast her off from its bosom.21
None of these men were supporters of the slavery extension that 
lay behind southern filibustering. They saw other reasons for 
the United States to shake the tree. Astraddle sea-lanes into the 
G ulf of Mexico and around Cape H orn to the Pacific, Cuba 
occupied a position from which a hostile navy could interdict 
traffic between the eastern seaboard and ports in the G ulf and 
Pacific. Its strategic importance was remarked upon by such 
different American presidents as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, 
Quincy Adams, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan.22 Such a rationale 
could not have escaped M aine’s many sailors and sea-captains.
Repeated slights by Spanish officials towards American 
citizens and their flag gave annexationists further impetus and 
helped blur the partisan divisions that stood in their way. 
A lthough such actions were the inevitable result of deteriorat­
ing relations caused by filibustering, Americans were u n ­
sympathetic to Spanish explanations. Most believed that such 
behavior could not be tolerated. Even the W hig press com ­
plained of “ the firing at American steamers” and warned om i­
nously that Americans "cannot be molested with im pun ity .” 
M eanwhile Democrats made hay of such events in their calls for 
the island’s acquisition.23
I n  Maine, tariffs created a powerful economic motive for 
picking the Cuban apple. 24 In retaliation for the Cardenas
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Expedition, Spain raised its already high tariffs on American 
products and instituted new carrying duties that discriminated 
heavily against vessels flying the Stars and Stripes.2'’ A Treasury 
Department report requested by the Senate Commerce Com­
mittee, chaired by M aine’s H annibal H am lin, concluded that 
these duties and U. S. measures to retaliate against them 
"caused a large portion of a valuable trade which legitimately 
belonged to the United States to pass in toother hands.”26 Many 
of these ships would have carried the products of Downeast 
loggers, farmers, and fisherfolk.
The deleterious effect of these fees was, in fact, of particu­
lar interest to H am lin ’s constituents. In general, shipowners 
were am ong the leading northern advocates of Cuban annexa­
tion.27 M aine’s bountiful forests and many harbors made ship­
ping and shipbuild ing two of the state’s most im portant indus­
tries. For most of the nineteenth century, Downeast shipyards 
built more ships with greater tonnage than those of any other 
state. In 1850, "no  other state built half as many, except New 
York.”28 Many of these vessels stayed in Maine or operated out 
of its ports. Bath and Portland were fifth and ninth respectively 
in an 1857 list of American cities where the greatest am ount of 
registered sh ipping wras owned.29 The state’s press complained 
bitterly about the new Spanish tariff, estimated to have cost the 
American merchant marine $60,000,000 annually .80
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At the same time, American tariffs were of the greatest 
concern to the state’s sugar merchants. Despite her canefields in 
Louisiana, the United States was one of the w orld’s largest 
sugar importers; most of this came from Cuba.31 Between 1840 
and 1860 the consum ption of sugar increased two or three times 
as fast as the population, and by 1860 reached close to thirty 
pounds per capita. Americans quickly grew even hungrier for 
sweets: By 1880 they were eating thirty-eight pounds of sugar 
per person per year.32 In Maine, sugar products in the form of 
molasses were an essential part of the lumber camp diet, con­
sidered “as a [more] necessary part of the supplies than almost 
any other article.”33
Sales of sugar and molasses were constricted by tariffs paid 
on these articles when they were imported. The tariff of 1846 set 
sugar duties on a scale ranging from two and a half to twelve 
cents per pound; im ported molasses paid five cents per gal­
lon.34 Such fees added considerably to the price of this article of 
everyday consum ption. H annibal H am lin expressed a view 
common in Maine when he said, “We have our molasses, sugar, 
etc. from Cuba, and these are strong reasons why it [Cuba] 
should belong to this country.”35 These im ports were at the 
heart of a chronic trade deficit with the island that between 1854 
and 1858 had reached a w hopping $88,556,299. This worrisome 
drain on American gold reserves warranted Congressional 
investigation.36 T he Portland Advertiser also acknowledged, 
though somewhat begrudgingly, that “ the great cry of ‘cheap 
sugar’ ... has made the annexation of Cuba an acceptable if not 
popu lar measure w ith so large a proportion of all political 
parties and sections of this country.”37
Portland, at the center of a huge re-exporting business, 
enhanced its wealth in the sugar trade. Its position as the leader 
of the box and barrel trade to Cuba gave its commission mer­
chants, like W. W. Woodbury, who employed agents on the 
island both selling lumber and buying sugar, a huge advantage 
over those in other cities.38 Such men helped make the city 
second only to New York in the sugar trade. In 1857 alone, 
Portland im ported 3,961,689 gallons of molasses and 6,639,744
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pounds of sugar, worth SI,350,901.39 Much of this went to John 
Bundy Brown, whose sugar refinery used 40,000 barrels of 
molasses a year to manufacture higher grades of sugar.40 His 
eight-story factory, covering more than an acre of ground, 
employed two hundred hands and was by far the state’s largest 
single employer. T he refinery annual ly produced $ 1,350,000 in 
sugar, an article which was quickly becoming a vital part of the 
American diet.41 Brown’s enterprise was not unique. One 1858 
voyage of the Diligence, from Matanzas to Portland, carried 
sugar and molasses to three different commission merchants as 
well as smaller quantities to three other individuals.42
The state’s farmers also suffered at the hands of Spanish 
customs officials, who singled out American flour for particu­
lar attention: American flour paid $10.81 a ton while Spanish 
paid only $2.50 a ton. With the new tariff, the value of U. S.
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flour exports to Cuba sank from $528,635 in 1847 to a virtually 
nonexistent $6,665 in 1850. One of America’s largest exports 
was thus excluded from a market of 800,000 to 900,000 barrels a 
year, which “would be enjoyed,” the Treasury Department 
noted with dismay, “almost exclusively by the United States. ”43 
A lthough Downeast wheat harvests had been steadily declin­
ing, it remained a staple of considerable importance for frontier 
areas of northern and eastern M aine.44 Exclusion was particu­
larly galling because South America and the islands of the 
Caribbean had long been markets of param ount im portance to 
American farmers. W ithout them, grain and particularly 
“flour exports would have approached the vanishing point in 
m uch of the period between 1820 and 1845.”45
M aine’s most im portant economic tie, however, was a 
vigorous trade exchanging lumber for Cuba’s sugar and 
molasses. Between 1854 and 1858 sawmills in the Pine Tree 
State cut almost a third of the $15,413,771 in lumber sent from 
the United States to the Spanish colony. Much of this was in the 
im portant barrel and box markets where Downeast merchants, 
led by those from Portland, controlled well over half of all such 
exports.46 The Bangor Mercury, a Whig sheet, thought that 
“accession of the Island of Cuba ... will benefit Maine, ... and 
Bangor more particularly, [because] ... it would have a vast 
effect on our lumber trade, and add largely to our prosperity.”47 
Given these im portant economic interests in Cuba, particu­
larly in the lumber trade, it is no surprise that annexation 
found its leading supporters in Maine in the lumber entrepots 
of Portland and Bangor.
While Cuban annexation offered an end to these onerous 
commercial restrictions and promised increased sales and prof­
its, at least in the eyes of its enthusiastic promoters in Maine, 
supporters of filibustering chose instead to play on the general 
sympathy for an “oppressed people” that even their opponents 
shared.48 They cast American intervention as “ the infusion of a 
sterner, more self denying, and enterprising race.”49 H igh taxes 
and tyranny from abroad were but “a portion of the grievances” 
which the Eastern Argus did “not think they [the Cubans]
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greatly over-state/’50 Spain’s harsh reprisals against revolu­
tionary activity evoked memories of Valley Forge and Bunker 
H ill, and Americans hoped to play France to C uba’s thirteen 
colonies.
Democratic sheets exploited this image to dispel the 
notion that filibusterers were buccaneers who exclusively 
represented the slavery interests of the South. The Piscataquis 
Observer fiercely defended foreign interference by “individuals 
who feel a love of liberty.” Lopez and his men were favorably 
compared with the Founding Fathers. To call them bandits, 
the Republican Journal explained, “would make our forefath­
ers rebels deserving of hanging, and of Lafayette, Rochambeau 
...and  Count Pulaski, ‘freebooters and pirates,’ terms which are 
continually applied to the Cuban arm y.”51
S u c h  efforts by Democrats in the Pine Tree State were 
largely successful. A lthough the Democracy’s national p la t­
form was silent on Cuban annexation, speakers touted the 
merits of the island’s acquisition at mass meetings throughout 
the country.5? D uring a New York stop on his stum p tour for 
the national party, Senator Douglas declared it “ the duty of the 
United States to seize it [Cuba] and hold it at all odds.” Such a 
policy, he told his enthusiastic followers, “is the destiny of the 
great Democratic party .”53 Two weeks earlier Douglas and 
another loud representative of Young America, Senator Pierre 
Soul£ of Louisiana, visited Augusta to deliver this standard 
stum p speech. There, in the fading warm th of the summer of 
1852, their addresses were applauded by an enthusiastic crowd 
of Maine supporters.54
In the September elections of 1852, the Maine Democratic 
party fared well. Democratic Governor H ubbard was re-elected, 
and President Pierce captured the state by 12 percent of the 
popular vote. In the presidential tally, where any concerns 
about a foreign policy issue like Cuban annexation would have 
been expressed, Pierce recaptured many of the swing voters that 
his party had lost to the Whigs in the 1848 election. Apathy
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am ong Free-Soil voters was another characteristic of the elec­
tion.55 If the Democrats’ Caribbean policy was a political liabil­
ity, clearly it was not a debilitating one.
Their continued good fortune, however, was dependent 
upon confidence in peaceful relations. Filibustering was not an 
explosive issue because it seemed unlikely to precipitate hostil­
ities. The im portance of foreign trade and sh ipping  to their 
prosperity made Downeasters particularly sensitive to such 
a prospect. Since the government was not officially involved in 
the attacks, there was little fear. Spain was too weak to fight and 
thus only resorted to fierce protests lodged with the State 
Departm ent.56 T he Portland Advertiser considered and then 
dismissed the possibility of intervention by the formidable 
British navy.57 The Democratic press also tried to discount the 
possibility of war.58 The “ total and ridiculous failure” of the 
Cardenas Expedition inclined some to conclude that it was 
“not probable we shall see another soon.”59 The failure of the 
Bahia H onda landings and the execution of Lopez seemed to 
assure the end of the filibustering and continued peace.
At the start of President Pierce’s term, leaders of his party 
could see no end to their ascendancy. Mainers viewed his 
adm inistration with a large measure of optim ism . T he G rand 
T runk  Railroad was nearly finished, and the state, particularly 
the Portland area, was entering a period of unprecedented 
grow th.60 The new president had graduated from Bowdoin and 
was a familiar quantity. From neighboring New Ham pshire, 
he offered not only Yankee common sense but the possibility of 
a healthy portion of the federal spoils. In fact, the Downeast 
coalition had been am ong the first to throw its support to 
Young Hickory at the Baltimore convention.61 When he deli­
vered his inaugural address, Pierce was secure in the knowledge 
that Maine, which had long been a Democratic state, rem ained 
securely in his party’s grasp. Its legislature had, w ith few excep­
tions, been controlled by the Democrats since the early days of 
the Jacksonian Democracy. Beneath this placid surface, how ­
ever, lay deep divisions over patronage, slavery extension, and 
temperance. Rancor over the Maine Law precipitated an 1852
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gubernatorial rupture, but the sectional calm offered by the 
Compromise of 1850, the unifying effects of federal patronage, 
and the almost total defeat of the Free-Soil and W hig parties 
seemed to herald a renewed vigor for Jackson’s adherents.62
In his inaugural address President Pierce spoke forcefully 
on the subject of Cuba. Vowing that his adm inistration would 
“not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expan­
sion,” he promised continued American expansion. Speaking 
specifically of Cuba, he reiterated its importance to American 
security and trade: “The acquisition of certain possessions not 
w ithin our jurisdiction [is] em inently im portant for our pro­
tection ... [and] essential for ... commerce.” Pierce followed his 
discussion of expansion with a pledge to conduct foreign 
affairs “ in a manner entirely consistent with the strictest obser­
vance of national faith and the cultivation of relations of 
peace.”63 Pierce promised Cuba at no cost.
The address received almost universal praise in the Pine 
Tree State; even W hig papers took up the chorus. Pierce’s calm 
insistence that foreign affairs be conducted with honor calmed 
fears that filibustering missions would lead to war. “It is plain 
th a t ... no filibustering will be allowed under this adm inistra­
tion. This is a good and gratifying doctrine,” was the satisfied 
remark from the Kennebec Journal.64 The state was further 
reassured by the president’s first State of the U nion address on 
December 5, 1853. In it, the New H am pshire m an reiterated his 
claim that “all means at my com mand will be vigorously 
exerted to repress” any filibustering attem pts against Cuba.65 
For Downeasters, this promised calm, both w ith Spain and 
the explosive slavery issue.
T h e  Kansas-Nebraska Bill, introduced on January 4, 
1854, re-ignited passions on this tender subject. The most con­
troversial portion of Senator Douglas’s bill allowed territorial 
governments to determine for themselves the legality of slavery. 
Acceptance of this doctrine of “squatter sovereignty” included 
an explicit repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which in 1820
14
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had banned slavery from Louisiana Purchase land north of 
36° 30'.66 Downeast, the measure evoked particularly strong 
passions because the Pine Tree State, in tandem with Missouri, 
had been adm itted to the U nion as a part of the com promise 
which m aintained the balance between slave and free states. For 
this reason Mainers felt personally involved in the Nebraska 
debate. T he b ill’s progress in Congress and the various 
speeches made there occupied the center of attention in the state 
for the next four m onths. D uring this time, scarcely a news­
paper appeared w ithout some editorial or bulletin on the sub­
ject. As a result, the issue of Cuban annexation largely disap­
peared from print, except as it related to the extension of 
slavery.
Despite the adm inistration’s efforts to enforce party unity, 
the bill divided the Pine Tree State as it did the country.67 Its 
effect, the Farmington Chronicle explained, “must be to 
weaken the ... democratic party and to draw greater numbers 
from a middle course to a decided stand on one or the other of 
the extreme w ings.’’68 These two extreme factions, known as 
the Wildcats and Woolheads, had existed w ithin the Demo­
cracy since the early 1840s, but previously, they had always been 
able to compromise. Over the Nebraska bill, they broke — 
Wildcats for, and Woolheads against.69 Many Woolheads were 
still sm arting from Pierce’s division of election spoils, which 
gave two of the sweeter plum s to prom inent Wildcat newspaper 
men. Isaac C. Haynes of the Democrat was appointed Bangor 
postm aster while Benjamin Kingsbury of the Eastern Argus 
received the collectorship for the port of Portland; both men 
had been strong supporters of the filibusterers.70 While patron­
age insured their continued loyalty, it added bitterness to 
attacks against the Nebraska legislation from the Woolhead 
press.
Most Downeasters shared the negative sentim ents of 
the Woolheads. H uge rallies, “ irrespective of party ,” convened 
to protest the act.71 Maine Congressman Israel W ashburn, a 
Whig, helped fan the flames when he corresponded with 
Charles Chandler, a leader in his party, to arrange a series of
15
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such mass meetings in Somerset and Piscataquis counties.72 
Protestant organizations also spoke out against the Nebraska 
b ill.73 By the end of February, the Kennebec Journal claimed 
that only five of the almost fifty Maine newspapers still sup­
ported Douglas’s initiative.74 O pponents com plained that the 
measure was designed to spread slavery over more territory. 
Some, like O rono’s W ashburn, actually believed that the bill 
was evidence of the aggressiveness of slavery.75
Such rhetoric in the W oolhead and W hig press created 
fears of a conspiracy am ong southerners, designed to dom inate 
the free North. T his cry of conspiracy was first uttered in a 
widely circulated manifesto by Salmon P Chase of Ohio, titled 
‘‘T he Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the 
People of the United States. ” Signed by several prom inent Free 
Soilers, his letter identified the Nebraska bill as “an atrocious 
p lo t” and “a bold scheme against American liberty.” Chase 
called “on the people to come to the rescue of the country from 
the dom ination of slavery.”76
Chase’s warnings of a slavery conspiracy were echoed in 
Maine. The threat of the “Slave Power,” in the words of a 
Dover-Foxcroft convention of Nebraska opponents, “sum ­
mons the free North to rise in its m ight.”77 The Nebraska Act 
would open huge tracts of land to the peculiar institution; the 
free states, they said, would be swept aside in a tide of black 
slavery. The theme was picked up in the press. T he Chronicle 
warned of the “ascendancy of slavery.”78 Such paranoid visions 
not only sold papers but also became a rallying cry for the 
Nebraska opposition and a symbol for the nascent Republican 
Party.79 The sim plicity of the Slave Power argum ent was 
accessible to the norm ally indifferent masses, and they 
responded in a great ou tpouring  of em otion.80 Chase’s 
“A ppeal” was so successful in mobilizing opposition to the 
Nebraska Bill and slavery expansion in general that he would 
later call it “ the most valuable [his italics] of my works.”81 
Maine Woolheads blamed their split with the national 
leadership on the existence of this Slave Power cabal, which 
had turned them out for adhering to the true principles of the
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Democracy — principles which were now being subverted by 
the South. With his resignation from the Senate, Downeast 
W oolhead H annibal H am lin cited its effort to make “ the flag 
of the Federal U nion ... carr[y] slavery wherever it floats.” This 
gospel gave the Woolheads the moral h igh ground in their 
bitter feud with the Wildcats for control of the party.82
In the midst of this internecine controversy, the seizure of 
the Black Warrior gave Pierce and the “ Young Am erica” circle 
w ithin  his adm inistration an opportunity  to press for Cuban 
acquisition. The vessel was owned by the New York and Ala­
bama Steamship Com pany and was part of a regular service 
between New York and Havana. On February 28, 1854, she was 
confiscated by Spanish authorities, and her captain, James D. 
Bulloch, was arrested for entering Havana with a manifest that 
declared her to be carrying only ballast when in fact she had a 
cargo in transit.
In response to the seizure, Secretary of State W illiam L. 
Marcy instructed Pierre Soul£, his m inister to Spain and for­
merly a strong advocate of the filibusterers in the Senate, to 
negotiate for the island’s purchase. In Madrid, the Louisiana 
m an tightened the vice on his hosts by issuing an ultim atum  
dem anding “immediate satisfaction from the wrong-doers at... 
H avana” and threatening that Americans, if denied, would 
then take “ the redress in their own hands.”83 The president also 
hinted, though more obliquely, at war. “It is vain to expect that 
... the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security 
of these states can long consist with peaceful relations.”84
Saber rattling was echoed by the regular Democratic press 
of Maine. The Eastern Argus, always a staunch advocate of the 
Pierce adm inistration, cheered Soule’s ultim atum  and the war 
that it threatened to create. “Well, let it — A war with Spain 
would take from her the brightest o f ... jewels. She holds Cuba 
by a frail tenure.”85 Southerners were also ecstatic at the pros­
pect of war. Pierce’s maneuvers promised finally to deliver 
w hat three failed filibustering missions had not: annexation of 
Cuba.
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Maine’s newspaper editors saw Pierce’s belligerence toward Spain as a sign of a 
growing “slave conspiracy” — part of an “infamous system of slavery agitation of 
which the Nebraska Bill was the first stepand thedissolution of the Union is intended 
to be the last.” Maine Historical Society Collections.
D o w n cas t, the concurrence of the Nebraska Act and 
threats of war w ith Spain added credence to fears of a slavery 
conspiracy.86 T he Whig and Courier saw Cuban conquest as 
part of an “infamous system of slavery agitation of which the 
Nebraska Bill was the first step and the dissolution of the 
U nion is intended to be the last.”87 Passage of the Nebraska Act 
changed the political climate completely and fused the connec­
tion between Douglas’s bill, Cuban annexation, and the slavery 
conspiracy. Its surprise victory in the House, despite a majority 
held there by the northern states, indicated the strength of the
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slave power. “Perfidious Slaveocracy T riu m p h an t,” declared 
Bangor’s Jeffersonian.™ Woolhead organs like the Chronicle of 
Farm ington and the Oxford Democrat of South Paris, which 
had largely been supportive of, or at least indifferent to Cuban 
annexation and the Black Warrior affair, saw this incident in a 
new light after the victory of the Nebraska bill. T he Oxford  
Democrat explained that it was simply “preparation for ... 
[further] aggrandizement of the slave power, the wresting of 
Cuba from Spain ... [and] the creation of yet other slave 
states.”89
T his nightm are was shared by Whigs as well. Former 
governor Edward Kent referred specifically to Cuba as he 
warned O rono’s Israel W ashburn of “ the manifest schemes of 
the Southern leaders to extend the area of slavery, indefinitely 
by conquest, or purchase, or robbery.”90
T he actions of Young America certainly seemed to be 
moving in this direction. O n May 1, Louisiana Senator John  
Slidell delivered a stirring address in which he advocated a 
suspension of the neutrality laws which barred filibustering.91 
Many in Maine worried that the address was “ the invitation of a 
war between the United States on the one part against Spain, 
England, and France on the other.”92 Pierce’s proclam ation on 
filibustering, an attem pt to quell fears about a new expedition 
being organized, was scoffed at in the Maine press.93
His effort failed because Downeasters questioned his 
sincerity. Many reasoned that Young Hickory and his cabinet 
were “puppets set in m otion by the South to do its w ill.”94 On 
this note at least, their cynicism was largely justified since 
Pierce intim ated to the former Louisiana governor that “ the 
governm ent would not see them sacrificed.”95 At the Royal 
Court in Madrid, the behavior of another Young American 
from the Delta state, Pierre Soul£, and persistent “rum ors of his 
indiscretions” w ith Spanish revolutionaries, complicated the 
already strained relations with that country and fanned war 
fears still further.96
T he W hig and W oolhead press exploited anxiety about 
the slavery conspiracy and its war to get “Cuba at all costs.”
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Reports about the imminence of war, the latest mission against 
the Spanish colony, and the role of the slave power in “forcing 
the present adm inistration into ... the program m e of dam ning 
in iqu ities” accelerated the panic.97 The opposition press 
printed dire predictions of British intervention “ to save Cuba” 
leaving Yankee shipping ruined and “our commerce des­
troyed.”98 T hat this propaganda represented a reversal of ear­
lier opinions expressed about the likelihood of war during 
Lopez’s missions was of little concern to leaders of the anti- 
Nebraska movement. With the British and French occupied in 
the Crimea, such intervention was in fact unlikely. War fear, 
however, was a valuable tool in forging a new political coali­
tion that would become the Republican party of Maine.99
The specter of war was vivid am ong Downeasters, who 
could still remember the ru ination  caused by the British block­
ade of the War of 1812. Even Pierce’s loyal supporter, the 
Eastern Argus , conceded that “peace is of much consequence to 
the development of our natural resources.” 100 T he business 
com m unity of Brunswick became so concerned that it 
appointed J. C. Hum phreys to write to their senator, H annibal 
H am lin, “ to avert so disastrous consequences [as] would result 
from what we consider an unnecessary collision with Spain.” 
Humphreys, a lumber dealer himself, reminded the chairm an 
of the Senate Commerce Committee of what he already under­
stood: “The disastrous consequences that would result to the 
whole commerce of this country is [sic] incalculable. O ur state, 
the 1st in No. of tons built and 3 in ownership in the Union, 
would be the greatest sufferer! [his italics].” 101
Fears generated by the Nebraska Act, the slavery conspi­
racy, and the prospect of war and commercial disaster created a 
volatile political chemistry in Maine and throughout the 
North. In the autum n election, Anson P. Morrill, a Woolhead, 
carried the Pine Tree State with fifty percent of the vote, one 
and a half times the total of the regular Democrat, Albion K. 
Parris. Morrill received the support of Whigs and a legion of 
voters normally silent at the polls who, moved by newspaper 
hysteria and the repeal of the sacred Missouri Compromise,
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flocked to him in droves.102 Significantly most of these new 
votes were cast in towns ' ‘engaged prim arily in m anufacturing 
and m aritim e activities.” 101 These areas were most sensitive to 
war and the pronouncem ents of the Woolhead and W hig press; 
here, Pierce’s Cuban policy and the opposition it solicited 
certainly played an im portant role in defeating the regular 
Democratic candidates.
For the president, elections in other northern states 
brought equally grim  news. His party lost in Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
New Jersey, and Indiana. The most dem oralizing loss, how­
ever, was New York, where not a single Democrat was returned 
to Congress. Two thirds of the northern Democratic seats in 
Congress were lost, along with the party’s majority. Pierce, 
who in 1852 had carried all but two of the northern states, faced 
the prospect of a hostile Congress.104
On November 4, 1854, the same day that the Democracy 
lost the Em pire State, Secretary of State Marcy first received, 
and the New York Tribune  first published, the proceedings of 
the infam ous conference at Ostend between Soul6 and the U. S. 
ministers to England and France, James Buchanan and John  
M ason.105 This document, the Ostend Manifesto, represented 
in the words of one scholar, “ the highwater mark of the move­
ment to annex Cuba before the Civil W ar.” It repeated the 
standard strategic and economic logic of annexation. Its asser­
tion that “by every law, hum an and Divine, we shall be justified 
in wresting it from Spain” was the most vigorous antebellum  
effort to effect it.106
Soule’s manifesto, advocating war with Spain, was ill- 
timed, given the adm inistration’s “crushing rebuke” at the 
polls. W ith his popularity  waning, Pierce could not even con­
template w ar.107 Marcy, his secretary of state, repudiated Soule, 
who prom ptly resigned.108 Nonetheless, the damage to Pierce’s 
popularity was done.
News of the Ostend Manifesto was, in the words of the 
Portland Advertiser, “the last n a il” in the coffin of a political 
corpse.109 M aine’s vigorous shipping and commercial interests,
21
Courier) of the amhoi.
which had once favored Cuban annexation, trembled at the 
threat of a destructive war to seize Cuba. For Downeasters, 
the prospec t of war was further evidence that the dangerous 
Slave Power dom inated the Democratic Party. New leaders 
emerged in this tense atmosphere and fanned these fears. The 
resulting partisan realignment destroyed the old Democratic 
party in Maine. Though Pierce tried to reform the remains of 
his party with a series of purges, the Maine organization woidd 
not be strong enough to cast its electoral votes for a Democrat 
until 1912, and even then only because of divisions in the 
opposition.110 Restrained by electoral developments in Maine 
and elsewhere in the North, the president stepped back from his 
aggressive cam paign to take Cuba; its acquisition would have 
to wait until 1898, a full fourteen years before the Pine Tree 
State would again go for a Democrat. T hough  economics had 
stoked interest in annexation early on, the threat of war and a 
heightened concern about slavery extension won out, as 
Mainers contemplated Cuban annexation before the Civil War.
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